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1 Introduction
Payment system is a set of arrangements made for the purpose of discharg-
ing obligations assumed by economic agents in their economic transactions.
There are two basic ingredients of payments systems: they are settlement (or
fund transfer) arrangements, and netting (or clearing) arrangements. Net-
ting is an offsetting of a similar type of financial obligations, and only the net
difference is settled. Thus arrangements for the binding netting of financial
obligations provide a service that is a very close substitute for the function
of money as a medium of payment. Netting between two parties is called
bilateral netting, and netting among multiple parties is called multilateral
netting. In the latter case netting is also referred to as clearing.
Foreign exchange transactions account for a large share of all payment
flows in major financial centers. Because financial institutions have strong
incentives to lower credit risk and payment flows, there have been active
movements toward structural innovations in interbank clearing and settle-
ment procedures and a number of proposals have been presented to establish
multilateral foreign exchange netting arrangements in recent years.
In this paper we would like to introduce a formal model of foreign ex-
change contracts netting, and present an analysis of multilateral and bilat-
eral netting from the view point of credit risk reduction. In particular, we are
interested in comparing these two different forms of netting arrangements
with respect to inherent systemic risks involved. In our analysis we will
introduce a comparative statics type argument in intrinsically stochastic en-
vironments. The approach might be termed as a comparative contingencies.
By looking at an event, given by a possible finite sequence of defaulting
banks, we shall compare credit risks of a bank between the two different
netting arrangements.
In the literature there have been very few studies that present formal
models in discussing payment systems. It appears that serious studies on
payment systems have just begun. Schoenmaker [6], and Rochet and Tirole
[5] present a formal model of interbank settlement system. Eisenberg [3],
Chakravorti [2], and Schoenmaker [7] present an analysis of systemic risks in
settlement systems. Humphrey [4] gives a simulation study of systemic risk.
We are not aware of formal models in which different netting arrangements
are analyzed. However, the Angell report [1] gives a very nice discussion
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and a verbal analysis of risk structures in different netting schemes.
2 A Model of Foreign Exchange Contracts Netting
We shall consider a finite set $I$ of financial institutions or banks that en-
gage in cross-border or off-shore foreign exchange transactions over discrete
points in time that may be referred to as dates also. A forei.$qn$ exchan.qe con-
tract or obligation specifies a contractual duty to deliver a defined (foreign)
currency in exchange for another (foreign) currency between two institutions
on an agreed date or value date. The words –transactions, contracts, and
obligations–are used synonymously in this paper. Institutions that engage
in a financial contract are called parties. The opposite party to a financial
contract is a counterparty. They are counterparties to each other. In this
section we will build up a model of foreign exchange contracts netting based
upon individual transactions of financial institutions.
Given a set of financial institutions $I$ , typical elements of $I$ will be written
as
$h,$ $i,j\in I$ .
The number of financial institutions, $\# I$ , to be considered for the purpose of
our analysis is assumed to be at least four so that $4\leq\# I<\infty$ .
Now, let us consider foreign exchange transactions between banks $i,j\in I$
at time $t_{1}$ , and collect all the transactions that take place on the same date
$t_{1}$ with identical value date $t_{2}(>t_{1})$ . Denote by
$J_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2})$
the set of all such transactions or contracts. With this notation above, we
have
$J_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2})=J_{ji}(t_{1}, t_{2})$
for any $i$ and $j$ and $J_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2})=\emptyset$ if $i=j$ . For convenience, a contract
$k\in J_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2})$ in this paper represents a “matched pair” of promises to
deliver foreign currencies to counterparties. A fore\’ign exchan.$qe$ contract
$k\in J_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2})$ at $t_{1}$ obligates bank $i$ to pay bank $j$ at time $t_{2}$ the amount
$y_{jik}(t_{1},t_{2}, d)$ of currency $d$ and receives the amount $y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)$ in currency
$c$ for some pair of currencies $c$ and $d$ . For notational convenience we put
$y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2}, d’)=0$ if the contract $k$ does not involve an exchange of cur-
rency $d’$ . In the notation $y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2C},)$ , suffix $i$ refers to a party, $j$ to its
counterparty, and $k$ to a contract. If $y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)$ is positive, then it means
that party $i$ is to receive the amount $y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2C},)$ from its counterparty $j$ ,
and the counterparty is to pay the amount $-y_{jik}(t_{1}, t_{2}, c)$ to the party $i$ .
If $y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)$ is negative, then $i$ is to pay to $j$ the $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}-y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)$,
and $j$ is to receive the amount $y_{j:k}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)$ from $i$ . Thus, for any contract
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$k\in J_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2})$ , we have
$y_{ijk}(t_{1}.,t_{2}, c)+y_{jik}(t_{1},t_{2},c)=0$ (1)
which states that the amount to be received or paid $(=y_{ijk}(t_{1}, t_{2}, c))$ by a
party is equal to the amount to be paid or received $(=-y_{jik}(t_{1},t_{2}, k))$ by
its counterparty respectively.
We assume that there is a finite set of (foreign) currencies traded in
the markets. It is denoted by $C$ . We assume $2\leq\# C<\infty$ . It is also
assumed that there is a ’base currency”, denoted by $b$ , that is used to
express values of all other currencies or that is the standard of value among
different currencies.
Nettin.$q$ is an offsetting of receipts and payments to be made for a similar
type of financial contracts. Bilateral nettin.$q$ is a netting between two parties.
It is considered to be a most natural form of netting in foreign exchange
transactions as large number of “matched trades” with same currency, same
value date and same counterparties exist.
Consider two banks $i$ and $j$ and the set of contracts $J_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2})$ between




respectively at time $t_{2}$ as a result of contracts in $J_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2})=J_{ji}(t_{1},t_{2})$ .
We shall define, for any $t_{1},$ $t_{2},$ $c$ with $t_{1}<t_{2}$ ,
$y_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2}, c) \equiv\dot{.}\sum_{k\in J_{j}(t_{1},t_{2})}y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)$
.
Here, summing the amounts $y_{ijk}(t_{1}, t_{2C},)$ of payments $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}/\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ receipts in-
stead of the amounts $y_{ijk}(t_{1}, t_{2}, c)^{-}$ of payments and the amounts $y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)^{+}$
of receipts separately over all the contracts in $J_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2})$ means that the vari-
ous payments $y_{ijk}(t_{1}, t_{2}, c)^{-}$ are offset against various receipts $y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)^{+}$
for $k\in J_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2})$ to arrive at one net amount $y_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2}, c).$ . With this nota-
tion, it follows from the equality in (1) that we have for each $t_{1},$ $t_{2},$ $c$
$y_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2},c)+y_{ji}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)=0$ , (2)
which means that the amount that $i$ is to receive from $j$ is equal to the
amount that $j$ is to pay to $i$ for each currency $c$ under bilateral netting.
For notational convenience, if there are no transactions in $J_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2})$ for
which $y_{ijk}(t_{1}, t_{2}, c)\neq 0$ , then we put
$y_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2,C})=0$. (3)
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In particular, if $J_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2})=\emptyset$, we have
$y_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2}, c)=0$
for all $c\in C$ .
We assume that all the forward foreign exchange contracts take place
during a definite time span that is given by time periods between $T_{1}$ and
$T_{2}$ . Let us define for each $t,$ $t_{2},$ $c$ with $t\leq t_{2}$
$x_{ij}(t, t_{2}, c) \equiv\sum_{t\mathrm{o}\leq t_{1}\leq t}y_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)$
,
where $t_{0}$ is the date at which an initial transaction of currency $c$ with value
at $t_{2}$ took place between $i$ and $j$ . The net amount, as of time $t$ , that $i$ is to
pay to or receive from $j$ in currency $c$ at time $t_{2}$ is expressed by $x_{ij}(t, t_{2}, c)$ .
There are two basic properties relating to $x_{ij}(t, t_{2}, c)$ .
First one is that it is the “accumulated” bilateral position at time $t$ of
bank $i$ with respect to $j$ for contracts in currency $c$ with value at $t_{2}$ , that is,
for any $t,$ $t_{2},$ $c$ with $t<t_{2}$ , we have
$x_{ij}(t, t_{2}, c)=x_{ij}(t-1, t_{2}, c)+y_{ij}(t, t_{2}, c)$ .
Second one is that we have again a fundamental “mirror image” equality for
any $t,$ $t_{2},$ $c$ with $t<t_{2}$ due to (2) that
$x_{ij}(t,t_{2C},)+x_{ji}(t,t_{2C},)=0$ . (4)
Let $q(t, t_{2}, c)$ denote forward exchange rates of currencies $c\in C$ quoted
in terms of the base currency $b$ at time $t$ with value at time $t_{2}$ . Now,
for a foreign exchange transaction $k\in J_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2})$ which took place at date
$t_{1}$ , there is a pair of currencies $(c,c’)$ for which we have $y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)\neq 0$ ,
$y_{ijk}(t_{1}, t_{2}, d)\neq 0$ and $y_{ijk}(t_{1}, t_{2}, d’)=0$ for $c”\neq c,$ $c’$ . For the pair $(c,c’)$ one
must have
$q(t_{1},t_{2}, c)y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)+q(t_{1},t_{2}, c’)y_{ijk}(t_{1},t_{2}, c’)=0$ .
It thus follows that for any contract $k\in J_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2})$
$\sum_{c\in C}q(t_{1},t_{2}, c)y_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2}, c)=0$
.
However, for $t_{1}<t\leq t_{2}$ , one may have
$\sum_{c\in C}q(t,t_{2}, c)y_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2}, c)\neq 0$
due to fluctuations in forward exchange rates $q(t, t_{2}, c)$ . If this amount is
negative, bank $i’ \mathrm{s}$ forward book shows a loss concerning the transactions
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at $t_{1}$ with value at $t_{2}$ . The amount $\sum_{c}q(t,t_{2}, c)y_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2}, c)$ represents the
mark-to-market value or net present value at time $t$ of the transactions at
time $t_{1}$ between banks $i$ and $j$ with value at time $t_{2}$ . We denote this value
by
$v_{ij}(t_{1}, t_{2})(t) \equiv\sum_{c\in C}q(t, t_{2}, c)y_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2,C})$ .
We now calculate the mark-to-market value or net present value of the
forward book of bank $i$ with respect to bank $j$ as of time $t$ which will be
written as $v_{ij}(t)$ . It is given by
$v_{ij}(t)\equiv$
$\sum_{t_{1}\leq t,t<t_{2}\leq T_{2}}v_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2})(t)$
for each $t$ . Note that by our notational convention in (3) we have $v_{ij}(t)=0$
if $i=j$ or if $J_{ij}(t_{1},t_{2})=\emptyset$ for all $t_{1}\leq t$ .
$v_{ij}(t)$ is the bilateral position of bank $i$ with bank $j$ at time $t$ concerning
$i’ \mathrm{s}$ forward book. We note that we have
$v_{ij}(t)+v_{ji}(t)=0$ . (5)
Since $v_{ij}(t)$ is the net present value of all forward transactions of $i$ with $j$
evaluated by forward prices at time $t$ , the equality (5) is interpreted to say
that in forward transactions both two parties cannot win at the same time
–a party or its counterparty must loose between the two.
3 Risk Assessment
3.1 Bilateral Credit Exposures
We first consider bilateral netting by novation between two banks $i$ and $j$ .
The amount $x_{ij}(t, t, c),$ $c\in C$ , exhibits the bilateral settlement position of
bank $i$ with respect to bank $j$ in the sense that it represents the amount of
currency $c\in C$ that bank $i$ is to receive from bank $j$ at time $t$ . Potential loss
of bank $i$ may arise during the course of business day $t$ from bank $j’ \mathrm{s}$ failure
to make settlements. It will be called the bilateral settlement $e\varphi osure$ in
currency $c\in C$ of bank $i$ with respect to $j$ .
Let us denote the bilateral settlement exposure at time $t$ by $\xi_{ij}(t, c)$ .
Then, by definition we have
$\xi_{ij}(t, c)\equiv x_{ij}(t, t, c)^{+}$
for $i,$ $j\in I$ and $c\in C$ . Note that settlement exposures at time $t$ derive
from contracts that are due to be settled on that day. Thus, it is natural
for exposures to be defined currency by currency.
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But in the event of a default of a counterparty, there is another potential
loss. It arises from the couterparty’s failure to honor its forward obligations.
When forward obligations are dishonored, it is natural to assume that each
bank replaces them by similar forward obligations in current markets to
resume its forward positions in each currency. Thus, the idea of close-out
netting, which is invoked in case of a default, is to compute replacement
costs of dishonored forward obligations. Loss arising from the failure of a
counterparty to honor its forward obligations will be termed as actual ex-
posure of a party with respect to its counterparty. It may also be called
mark-to-market exposure or net present value exposure. Following the no-
tation of our model, the (actual) bilateral $e\varphi osure$ at time $t$ of bank $i$ with
respect to bank $j$ , denoted by $\epsilon_{ij}(t)$ , is thus defined by
$\epsilon_{ij}(t)$ $\equiv$ $v_{ij}(t)^{+}$
$( \sum_{t<t_{\mathit{2}}\leq T_{2}}\sum_{c}q(t,t_{2}, c)x_{ij}(t,t_{2}, c))^{+}$
3.2 Multilateral Credit Exposures
Let the set of financial institutions $I$ represent the group of participating
banks to an arrangement ofmultilateral netting by novation and substitution
for clearing and settlement, and that of multilateral close-out netting in case
of a default. The clearing house will be denoted by the letter $H$ . Define for
each $i\in I$ and $t,$ $t_{2},$ $c$
$x_{iH}(t, t_{2}, c)$ $\equiv$ $\sum x_{ij}(t, t_{2}, c)$ ,
$x_{Hi}(t, t_{2C},)$ $\equiv$ $\sum_{j\in I}^{j\in I}x_{ji}(t, t_{2,C})$ .
Other notations with respect to $H$ are introduced similarly. For example,
for $i\in I$ and $t$ ,
$v_{iH}(t)$ $\equiv$ $\sum v_{ij}(t)$ ,
$v_{Hi}(t)$ $\equiv$ $\sum_{j\in I}^{j\in I}v_{ji}(t)$ .
In essence suffix $H$ indicates that sum is taken over all participating banks
to netting and clearing arrangements.
Under a multilateral netting arrangement by novation and substitution,
multilateral settlement position in currency $c$ at time $t$ is given by
$x_{iH}(t,t, c)$ $=$ $\sum x_{ij}(t, t,c)$
$j \in I\sum\sum$
$\sum$ $y_{ijk}(t_{1},t,c)$ .
$j\in It_{1}\leq tk\in J:j(t_{1},t)$
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for each participating bank $i\in I$ . Here, for every contract $k\in J_{ij}(t_{1}, t)$ ,
$t_{1}\leq t$ , the clearing house is substituted for the counterparty $j$ so that the
bilateral settlement position $x_{ij}(t, t, c)$ of $i$ with respect to $j$ becomes only
a part of settlement position of $i$ with respect to the clearing house $H$ .
Taking the sum of $x_{ij}(t, t, c)’ \mathrm{s}$ over $j\in I$ means totalling all those parts
of bilateral settlement positions of counterparties of bank $i$ for which the
clearing house is substituted. Thus, the multilateral settlement position of
$i$ given by $x_{iH}(t,t, c)$ is the bilateral settlement position of $i$ with respect
to the clearing house after substitutions and novations of obligations are
effected.
We are now concerned with the amount of forward book positions of
bank $i$ that is exposed to a default risk. If bank $j(\neq i)$ will default at time $t$ ,
potential loss of bank $i$ is not necessarily given by the amount $v_{iH}(t)^{+}$ nor
$v_{ij}(t)^{+}$ . It is because original contracts of bank $i$ with bank $j$ are replaced by
those with the clearing house. Hence, possible losses that each bank must
face in multilateral netting depend upon how losses are allocated among
participating banks in netting arrangements.
Bilateral position under a multilateral netting arrangement will be called
notional bilateral position. The notional bilateral forward position of bank $i$
with bank $j$ at time $t$ is
$v_{ij}(t)$ $=$
$\sum_{t<t_{\mathit{2}}\leq T_{\mathit{2}}}\sum_{c\in C}q(t, t_{2}, c)x_{ij}(t, t_{2}, c)$
.
The multilateral (forward) position of bank $i$ at time $t$ is
$v_{iH}(t)= \sum_{j\in I}v_{ij}(t)$
.
The amount $v_{iH}(t)$ is the bilateral position of bank $i$ with respect to the
clearing house at time $t$ under close-out netting. We say bank $i$ at time $t$
has a multilateral profit position if $v_{1H}(t)>0$ and a multilateral loss position
if $v_{iH}(t)<0$ .
Let us introduce a few more concepts before going into definitions of
forward book credit exposures. We say that bank $i’ \mathrm{s}$ forward position is
perfectly hed.qed or that bank $i’ \mathrm{s}$ forei.qn exchan.$qe$ risk is perfectly hed.qed at
time $t$ if
$(\forall c\in C,\forall t_{2}\leq T_{2})$
$\sum_{j\in I}x_{ij}(t, t_{2}, c)=0$
.
If bank $i’ \mathrm{s}$ forward position is perfectly hedged, then, for all $T_{1}\leq t\leq T_{2}$ ,
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we have
$v_{iH}(t)$ $=$ $\sum v_{ij}(t)$
$j \in I\sum$
$\sum$ $\sum q(t,t_{2}, c)x_{ij}(t, t_{2}, c)$
$j\in It<t_{2}<T_{2\mathrm{C}}\in C$
$\sum_{t<t_{\mathit{2}}\leq T_{2}}\sum_{c\in C}q(t, t_{2}, c)\sum_{j\in I}x_{ij}(t,t_{2}, c)-$
$=$ $0$
so that for all $t$
$v_{iH}(t)=0$ .
That is, if the forward position of a bank is perfectly hedged, then its forward
position with the clearing house is nil. From a traditional banker’s point of
view it represents an ideal situation for foreign exchange transactions and,
moreover, it will correspond to the most ideal case for contracts netting
efficiency as all the credits exactly offset all the debits in each currency at
every due date.
Fact 1 [Clearing Efficiency] If a panicipatin.q bank’s forward position is
perfectly hed.qed, then no settlements are needed at due dates as credits and
debits are fully matched.
Even if bank $i’ \mathrm{s}$ foreign exchange risk is perfectly hedged so that $v_{iH}(t)=$
$0$ , it faces default risks of counterparties. Assume that one of the counter-
parties, say bank $j$ , of forward contracts that bank $i$ had, defaulted at time $t$ .
Then, a general rule of the clearing house is to allocate default induced losses
among the participants, called concemed participants or concemed banks,
who have contracts with the defaulting bank maturing at time $t$ . Losses
are allocated pro rata to the profit levels of the concerned participants. By
assuming this loss allocation rule, we define multilaterally netted bilateral
exposure or indirect bilateral $e\varphi osure$ of bank $i$ with respect to bank $j$ at
time $t$ , denoted by $\eta_{ij}(t)$ , to be
$\eta_{ij}(t)\equiv(\frac{v_{ij}(t)^{+}}{\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj}(t)+})v_{Hj}(t)^{+}$.
It simply says that the loss $v_{Hj}(t)^{+}$ of the clearing house caused by the
default of bank $j$ is allocated among those participants $i$ having notional
profit position with bank $j$ , i.e., $v_{ij}(t)^{+}>0$ , according to the ratio
$( \frac{v_{ij}(t)^{+}}{\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj}(t)+})$
of its profit level to the total of profits made by concerned banks in trans-
action with the defaulting bank $j$ .
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Now, assume bank $j’ \mathrm{s}$ forward position is not perfectly hedged so that
at time $t$
$v_{jH}(t)\neq 0$
and assume that the net present value of its forward books show a great deal
of losses, a typical situation for a defaulting bank. Then, the actual credit
$e\varphi osure$ of the clearin.$q$ house with respect to bank $j$ at time $t$ is
$v_{Hj}(t)^{+}$ $=$ $( \sum_{i\in I}v_{ji}(t)^{+}-\sum_{i\in I}v_{ji}(t)^{-})^{-}$
$\max\{0,$ $\sum_{i\in I}v_{ij}(t)^{+}-\sum_{i\in I}v_{ij}(t)^{-}\}$ . (6)
We thus obtain
$\sum_{i\in I}v_{ij}(t)^{+}-v_{Hj}(t)^{+}$
$=$ $\min\{\sum_{i\in I}v_{ij}(t)^{+},$ $\sum_{i\in I}v_{ij}(t)^{-}\}$ . (7)




$v_{Hj}(t)^{+}= \sum_{i\in I}v_{ij}(t)^{+}-\sum_{i\in I}v_{ij}(t)^{-}$
Proposition 1 [Credit Exposure of the Clearing House] Suppose that
bankj has a multilateral loss position at time $t$. Then, the sum of the bilateral
credit exposures of other participants with respect to the bank $j$ at time $t$
exceeds the actual cred\’it exposure of the clearin.$q$ house w\’ith respect to $j$ by the
amount of the sum of losses that the participants are makin.$q$ in transactions
with $j$ , i.e.
$\sum_{i\in I}v_{ij}(t)^{+}-v_{Hj}(t)^{+}=\sum_{i\in I}v_{ij}(t)^{-}$ (8)
One can immediately compare direct bilateral exposure with indirect
bilateral exposure. Using the equality (8), one obtains
$\epsilon_{ij}(t)-\eta_{ij}(t)$ $=$ $\frac{v_{ij}(t)^{+}}{\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj}(t)+}(\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj}(t)^{-})$ . (9)
Proposition 2 [Bilateral Exposure $\mathrm{v}\mathrm{s}$ . Multilaterally Netted Bilateral Ex-
posure] The difference between direct bilateral $e\varphi osure$ and indirect bilat-
eral $e\varphi osure$ of a bank $i$ with respect to any other bank $j\neq i$ havin.q a
multilateral loss position at time $t$ is exactly equal to the sum of losses of
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individual banks in transaction with the bank $j$ multiplied by the proportion
of bank $i’s$ profits to the total profits of all the participatin.$q$ banks in trans-
actions with the bank $j$, i.e.
$\frac{v_{ij}(t)^{+}}{\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj}(t)^{+}}(\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj}(t)^{-})$
Let us introduce a notion which indicates the extremity of market risk.
We say that the forei.$qn$ exchan.qe risk of bank $i$ at time $t$ is extreme if for all
$h\neq i$
$v_{ih}(t)^{+}=0$ .
and for some $h\neq i$
$v_{ih}(t)^{-}\neq 0$ .
One may decompose the reduction of total credit exposures in (8) into
that of individual banks. We define (apparent) bilateral benefits of multilat-
eral nettin.$q$, denoted by $\beta_{ij}(t)^{1}$, as the residual of direct bilateral exposures
over indirect bilateral exposures, that is,
$\beta_{ij}(t)$ $\equiv$ $\epsilon_{ij}(t)-\eta_{ij}(t)$
$v_{ij}(t)^{+}-( \frac{v_{ij}(t)^{+}}{\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj}(t)+})v_{Hj}(t)^{+}$ .
It follows from the definition of the bilateral benefits of multilateral netting
and the equation (9) that
$\beta_{ij}(t)$ $=$
$= \sum_{h\in I}v_{hj}(t)^{+}\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj}(t)^{+}v_{ij}(t)^{+}v_{ij}(t)^{+}\{\begin{array}{l}\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj}(t)^{-}\sum_{h\in I}v_{jh}(t)^{+}\end{array})$
.
Thus, if the foreign exchange risk of bank $j$ is not extreme, there will be
positive (apparent) bilateral benefits (i.e., $\beta_{ij}(t)>0$) of multilateral netting
on the part of concerned participant $i$ , having a positive bilateral exposure,
i.e., $v_{ij}(t)^{+}>0$ . But if the foreign exchange risk of bank $j$ is extreme, then
the above equation for $\beta_{ij}(t)$ shows that $\beta_{ij}(t)=0$ , that is, there are no
bilateral benefits of multilateral netting over bilateral netting. Thus one
obtains the following proposition.
Proposition 3 [Bilateral $\mathrm{B}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{N}$ -Benefits ofMultilateral Netting] Sup-
pose that bank $j$ is makin.$q$ a loss on its forward book at time $t$ . If its forei.$qn$
1One should not be misled by the tenn benefit. This need not be an actual benefit
when one considers a possibility of systemic risk.
204
exchan.$qe$ risk is not extreme, then for any concemed participant having a
positive (notional) bilateral credit $e\varphi osure$, the bilateral benefit of multilat-
eral nettin.$q$ is positive. But if bank 7 $‘ s$ forei.qn exchan.$qe$ risk is ertreme, then
there will be no benefits of multilateral nettin.$q$.
The implication of this proposition is that as the loss-making bank’s
foreign exchange risk increases the bilateral benefit of multilateral netting
declines. It has a policy implication as well: in order for a multilateral
netting system to have increased efficiency for reducing credit risks, extreme
foreign exchange contract positions should be controlled.
4 Systemic Risk Assessment
We now consider a possibility of chain reactions of multiple defaults of par-
ticipating banks to a multilateral netting system. If a finite sequence of
defaulting banks $\{j_{n}\}_{n=1,\ldots,N}$ at time $t$ is given, a bank $j\in\{j_{n}\}_{n=1,\ldots,N}$ is
called a defaulter or a defaultin.$q$ bank and a bank $j\not\in\{j_{n}\}_{n=1,\ldots,N}$ is called
a survivor or a surwivin.$q$ bank. Given a defaulting bank $j$ , a surviving bank
$i$ is called positively concemed if
$v_{ij}(t)^{+}>0$ ,
and is called ne.qatively concemed if
$v_{ij}(t)^{-}>0$ .
Let a finite sequence of banks $\{j_{n}\}_{n=1,\ldots,N}$ with $1\leq N\leq\# I-1$ is a
possible set of defaulters at time $t$ . For simplicity we assume that all the
defaults at time $t$ occurs in a time stream matching the order in the sequence
$\{j_{n}\}_{n}$ during the date $t$ but before the beginning of the next date $t+1$ .
Our assumed loss share rule is to distribute the losses of the clearing
house, due to a default of a participant, among positively concerned surviv-
ing banks according to the ratio of their notional bilateral profit levels with
respect to the defaulter at each round of default. Let us first define
$r_{ij_{n}}^{m}(t) \equiv\frac{v_{i.j_{n}}(t)^{+}}{\sum_{h\neq j_{1},..,j_{m}}v_{hj_{n}}(t)+}$
for $i\neq j_{1},$ $\ldots,j_{m}$ and $n\leq m\leq N$ . $r_{ij_{n}}^{m}(t)$ represents the proportion of the
loss, $v_{Hj_{\iota}},(t)^{+}$ , caused by the n-th defaulter $j_{n}$ at time $t$ , which the bank $i$
has to share immediately after the m-th default. Coefficients, $r_{ij_{n}}^{m}(t)’ \mathrm{s}$ may
be called direct bilateral loss share coefficients at m-th round. We will need
notation to express proportions of losses shared by subsequent defaulters for
their preceding defaulters.
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Given a finite sequence of banks $\{j_{n}\}_{n=1,\ldots,N}$ at time $t$ , define for $m=$
$2,$
$\ldots,$
$N,$ $n=1,$ $\ldots,$ $N-1,$ $m\geq n+1$
$r_{mn}(t) \equiv\sum_{s=n}^{m-1}r_{j_{m}j_{n}}^{s}(t)r_{sn}(t)$ (10)
with a convention that
$r_{nn}(t)\equiv 1$
for $n=1,$ $\ldots$ , $N\cdot-1$ . In particular, we have
$r_{21}(t)$ $=$ $r_{j_{2}j_{1}}^{1}(t)$
$r_{31}(t)$ $=$ $r_{j_{3}j_{1}}^{1}(t)+r_{j\mathrm{s}j_{1}}^{2}r_{21}(t)$..
$r_{N1}(t)$ $=$ $r_{j_{N}j_{1}}^{1}(t)+r_{j_{N}j_{1}}^{2}(t)r_{21}(t)+\ldots+r_{j_{N}j_{1}}^{N-1}(t)r_{(N-1)1}$ .
$r_{mn}(t)$ is the total sum of the direct and indirect proportional loss shares
of the m-th defaulter for the loss of the n-th defaulter accumulated as the
sequential defaults continued up to the $(m-1)- \mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}$ round. In this sense,
coefficients $r_{mn}(t)’ \mathrm{s}$ may be called total bilateral loss share coefficients among
defaulters.
Proposition 4 [Property of Loss Share Coefficients] For any $n=1,$ $\ldots$ , $N$ ,
the followin.$q$ equality holds:
$\sum_{s=n}^{k}r_{j_{m}j_{n}}^{s}(t)r_{sn}(t)=r_{j_{m}j_{n}}^{k}(t)$ (11)
for $m=n+1,$ $\ldots$ , $N$ and $k=n,$ $\ldots$ , $m-1$ .
As an immediate corollary to Proposition 4 one obtains the following
proposition:
Proposition 5 [Loss Share Coefficients and Direct-Indirect Loss Share]
Given two defaulters $j_{m}$ and $j_{n}$ with $j_{n}$ preceding $j_{m}$ in the default sequence
at time $t$ , the total sum of proportional shares of loss, due to the default of
$j_{n}$ , that the bank $j_{m}$ has to share directly or indirectly, is exactly equal to
the direct proportional loss share of $j_{m}$ excluding the first $m-1$ defaulters,
that is,
$r_{mn}(t)=r_{j_{m}j_{n}}^{m-1}(t)$
The following proposition shows the similar. property as in Proposition
4 for an arbitrary participating bank to multilateral netting arrangements.
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Proposition 6 [Loss Share Coefficients in General] For any participating
bank $i\in I$ to the multilateral nettin.$q$, the direct loss share coefficients at the
m-th round of defaults with respect to the loss of the clearin.$q$ house due to
the n-th defaulter $(n\leq m),$ $r_{ij_{l\iota}}^{m}(t)$ , is exactly equal to its accumulated direct
and indirect loss shares up to the m-th round of defaults, that is, for any
$i\neq j_{1},$ $\ldots,j_{n},$ $n=1,$ $\ldots,$ $N$ or for any $i=j_{n’}$ , with $n’\geq m\geq n,$ $n’\neq n$ ,
one has
$r_{ij_{n}}^{m}(t)= \sum_{s=n}^{m}r_{ij_{n}}^{s}(t)r_{sn}(t)$ (12)
for $m=n,$ $\ldots,$ $N$ .
Let us introduce further notation to express surviving banks’ total direct
and indirect loss shares. For each $i\neq j_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $j_{N}$ and for each $n=1,$ $\ldots,$ $N$ ,
define
$l_{in}(t) \equiv\sum_{m=n}^{N}r_{ij_{n}}^{m}(t)r_{mn}(t)$ .
$l_{in}(t)$ is the total sum of proportional shares by bank $i$ of the loss caused by
the n-th defaulter, accumulated at the end of the default sequence $\{j_{n}\}_{n=1,\ldots,N}$
at time $t$ . As an immediate corollary to Proposition 6, we obtain the fol-
lowing:
Proposition 7 [Survivors’ Total Loss Share Coefficients] For any surviv-
ing bank $i$ , the total sum of direct and indirect proportional shares of the loss
of the clearing house due to the n-th defaultin.$q$ bank is identical to the direct
proportional share of the loss of the clearin.$q$ house due to the n-th defaulter
when all the $N$ defaulters are excluded in the calculation of its proportional
share, that is,
$l_{in}(t)=r_{ij_{n}}^{N}(t)$ .
Given a finite sequence of banks $\{j_{n}\}_{n=1,\ldots,N}$ at time $t$ with $1\leq N\leq$
$\# I-1$ , the systemic credit exposure of bank $i$ at time $t$ with respect to the
sequence $\{j_{n}\}_{n=1,\ldots,N}$ , written $\sigma_{ij_{1}\ldots j_{N}}(t)$ , is defined by
$\sigma_{ij_{1}\ldots j_{N}}(t)\equiv\sum_{n=1}^{N}(\sum_{m=n}^{N}r_{ij_{n}}^{m}(t)r_{mn}(t))v_{Hj_{n}}(t)^{+}$ (13)
for $i\neq j_{1},$ $\ldots,j_{N}$ and $n\leq m\leq N$ . In the expression (13), n-th term is
composed of $N-n+1$ parts. The first part $r_{ij_{n}}^{n}(t)v_{Hj_{n}}(t)^{+}$ represents the
bank $i’ \mathrm{s}$ direct share of the loss of the clearing house due to the default of
n-th bank. The m-th part $r_{ij_{n}}^{m}(t)r_{mn}(t)v_{Hj_{n}}(t)^{+},$ $n<m\leq N$ , represents
the bank $i’ \mathrm{s}$ indirect share of the loss that the m-th defaulting bank $j_{m}$ had
to share for the loss caused by the n-th defaulting bank $j_{n}$ .
With the interpretation of each term in the expression (13) as above, the
systemic credit exposure of a survived bank $i$ represents the sum of its share
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of losses that are directly or indirectly related to its forward book profits
position with respect to defaulting banks. In order to see that a participant
may have to share a part of the losses that are indirectly related to its profit
position, let us take for example the term $r_{ij_{1}}^{3}(t)r_{31}(t)v_{Hj_{1}}(t)^{+}$ in a sequence
of three-bank defaults. It represents the part of the losses of the initial
defaulting bank $j_{1}$ which came to.be shared by the surviving bank $i$ because
it was originally due to be shared by bank $j_{3}$ that subsequently defaulted.
We are ready to define the benefit of multilateral nettin.$q$ of bank $i$ with
respect to a given finite sequence $\{j_{n}\}_{n=1,\ldots,N}$ of banks at time $t$ . It is defined
by
$\beta_{ij_{1}\ldots j_{N}}(t)\equiv\sum_{n=1}^{N}\epsilon_{ij_{n}}(t)-\sigma_{ij_{1}\ldots j_{N}}(t)$ (14)
The benefit of multilateral netting is thus the difference between the sum of
notional bilateral credit exposures and the systemic credit exposures with
respect to a given sequence of banks. So to speak, our approach is that of the
comparison by contin.qencies in assessing the possible benefit of multilateral
netting vis-\‘a-vis bilateral netting.
One can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 8 [General Decreasing Benefits ofMultilateral Netting] Sup-
pose that there is a possibility of multiple defaults amon.$q$ participants to a
multilateral nettin.$q$ system with the initial defaultin.$q$ bank havin.$q$ a multilat-
eral loss position. Then, for any participating bank $i$ to the nettin.$q$ system,
the sum of bilateral benefits of multilateral nettin.$q$ always overstates actual
benefits of multilateral nettin.$q$, i.e. $\beta_{ij_{1}\cdots j_{n}}(t)<\sum_{n=1}^{N}\beta_{ij_{n}}(t)$ , if, in a se-
quence of possible multiple defaulters at time $t$ ,
$\bullet$ there is a subsequent defaulter with whom the participant $i$ is posi-
tively concemed and who is positively concemed with the immediately
precedin.$q$ defaulter, $or$
$\bullet$ there are at least two defaulters with the preceding defaulter havin.$q$ a
multilateral loss position such that $ihe$ participant $i$ is positively con-
cemed with the precedin.$q$ defaulter and that the succeeding defaulter is
positively concemed with the precedin.$q$ defaulter.
In comparing merits of multilateral netting with those of bilateral netting
from a view point of credit risk reduction one might be tempted to com-
pare multilaterally netted bilateral exposures with (actual) bilateral credit
exposures. However, if one does compare bilateral netting with multilat-
eral netting using the sum of bilateral benefits of multilateral netting in the
similar spirits as above, then Proposition 8 above warns us that in possible
events of multiple bank failures one overestimates the benefits of multilat-
eral netting because the actual benefit of multilateral netting is strictly less
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than the sum of bilateral benefits of multilateral netting due to a possibility
of an indirect sharing of losses of defaulting banks.
One should probably stress the fact that there are possibilities of indirect
sharing of losses in face of a chain reaction of multiple defaults that could
reduce the attractiveness of multilateral netting system over that of bilateral
netting system. Actual situation for multilateral netting may be worse in
the sense that a reversal of relative attractiveness of netting between multi-
lateral and bilateral netting may occur when one allows for a consideration
of multiple defaults. In order to show that there are possibilities of negative
benefits of multilateral netting over bilateral netting, we wish to proceed to
exhibit conditions under which we would have
$\beta_{ij_{1}\cdots j_{N}}(t)<0$
in general.
Recall that bank $i$ has a perfectly hed.qed position at time $t$ if
$(\forall c\in C,\forall t_{2}\leq T_{2})$
$\sum_{j\in I}x_{ij}(t, t_{2}, c)=0$
.
If bank $i$ has a perfectly hedged position at time $t$ , then
$v_{iH}(t)=0$ .
Even if a bank has a perfectly hedged position, it cannot avoid default risk of
a counterparty. This motivates us to introduce a further concept of perfect
hedging. Let us say that bank $i$ has a pairwise perfectly hed.qed position with
respect to bank $j\neq i$ at time $t$ if
($\forall c\in C$ and $\forall t_{2}\leq T_{2}$ ) $x_{ij}(t, t_{2}, c)=0$ . (15)
A perfect pairwise hedging with respect to all $j\neq i$ clearly implies a perfect
hedging. But note that if a party has a pairwise perfectly hedged position
with respect to its counterparty, then it will not face default risk of its coun-
terparty. Since our focus is the reduction of credit risk rather than that
of market or foreign exchange risk in comparing different netting arrange-
ments, we shall analyze in this subsection participants who have a perfectly
hedged position but not a pairwise perfectly hedged position with an initial
defaulter for, otherwise, it will not face credit risk. However, in order to
minimize the complexity of analysis we analyze cases of a chain of bank
defaults where a participant has pairwise perfectly hedged positions with
secondary and subsequent defaulters.
A scenario of systemic risk we consider in this subsection is as follows:
$\bullet$ The original defaulter $j_{1}\in I$ fails to meet its obligations at time $t$ .
The bank $j_{1}$ faces foreign exchange risk at time $t$ and its multilateral
position shows a huge loss by an amount $L_{1}>0$ so that
$v_{Hj_{1}}(t)^{+}=v_{j_{1}H}(t)^{-}=L_{1}>0$ .
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$\bullet|$ Bank $i$ has a perfectly hedged forward position so that
$v_{iH}(t)=0$ ,
but it has bilateral profit position with the initial defaulter $j_{1}$ . The
bank $i$ , however, has pairwise perfectly hedged positions with the re-
maining defaulting banks $j_{2},$ $\ldots,j_{N}$ .
Then, we have
$v_{ij_{n}}(t)^{+}=0$ for $n=2,$ $\ldots$ , $N$ .
To ease our notation, put




II $\equiv$ $\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj_{1}}(t)^{+}$ , and
$\delta$ $\equiv$ $\frac{\sum_{h=j_{\mathit{2}},\ldots,j_{N}}v_{hj_{1}}(t)^{+}}{\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj_{1}}(t)+}$
$\pi$ is the notional bilateral profit of the bank $i$ with respect to the initial
defaulter $j_{1}$ and 11 is the total sum of notional bilateral profits of participants
with respect to the defaulter $j_{1}$ . $l$ , on the other hand, is the total sum of
notional bilateral losses of participants with respect to $j_{1}$ . We have
$L_{1}=\mathrm{I}\mathrm{I}-l$
and since we are assuming that the initial defaulter $j_{1}$ is making a huge loss,
put
$\Gamma \mathrm{I}=Ml$
for some “large” number $M$ . Then,
$L_{1}=(M-1)l$
Now, it follows from the equality (??) that we have
$\beta_{ij_{1}\ldots j_{N}}(t)$
$=$ $r_{ij_{1}}^{N}(t) \min\{\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj_{1}}(t)^{-}-\sum_{h=j_{1},..,j_{N}}.v_{hj_{1}}(t)^{+},\sum_{h\neq j_{1},\ldots,j_{N}}v_{hj_{1}}(t)^{+}\}$
$=$ $r_{ij_{1}}^{N}(t)( \sum_{h\in I}v_{hj_{1}}(t)^{-}-\sum_{j_{\mathit{2}},\ldots,j_{N}}v_{hj_{1}}(t)^{+})$ (16)
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where the first and second equalities follow from the assumed properties that
$i$ has pairwise perfectly hedged positions with respect to banks $j_{2},$ $\ldots,j_{N}$ so
that $v_{ij_{n}}(t)^{+}=0$ for $n=2,$ $\ldots,$ $N$ , and that
$v_{Hj_{1}}(t)^{+}= \sum_{h\in I}v_{hj_{1}}(t)^{+}-\sum_{h\in I}v_{hj_{1}}(t)^{-}>0$ .
Using simplified notation, one obtains
$\beta_{ij_{1}\ldots j_{N}}(t)=r_{ij_{1}}^{N}(t)(l-\delta\Pi)$ . (17)
Since $\delta\Pi=\delta Ml$ and since $i$ is positively concerned with $j_{1}$ so that $r_{1j_{1}}^{N}.(t)>0$ ,
we have
$\beta_{ij_{1}\ldots j_{N}}(t)<0\Leftrightarrow\delta M>1$ . (18)
This gives a necessary and sufficient condition under which one has
$\beta_{ij_{1}\ldots j_{N}}(t)<0$ .
Recall that $M$ indicates that the total of the notional bilateral losses of the
initial defaulter with its counterparties is $M$ times the total of its profits with
its counterparties. Thus, the systemic credit exposure under a multilateral
netting system is always greater than the sum of bilateral credit exposures
with respect to the possible sequence of defaulting banks if and only if
$M$ times the proportion of the sum of notional bilateral profits of all the
remaining defaulters to the total of notional bilateral profits with the initial
defaulter is greater than 1, that is, $\delta M>1$ ; in other words, if and only if
$M$ is large enough so that its inverse is strictly less than the proportion of
the sum of notional bilateral profits of the remaining defaulters to the total
of notional bilateral profits of all the participants with respect to the initial
defaulter. This condition will be met if the total of bilateral losses of the
initial defaulter is very large relative to its profits at time $t$ .
Since one has






still another way of stating the condition above is that the total of notional
bilateral profits of the remaining defaulters, with respect to the initial de-
faulter, is strictly greater than the total of notional bilateral losses of all the
participants with respect to the initial defaulter.
We thus obtain the following proposition which we regard as the main
result of the present paper:
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Proposition 9 [Multilateral $\mathrm{v}\mathrm{s}$ . Bilateral Netting] Consider a possible
arbitrary finite sequence of defaultin.$q$ banks $\{j_{n}\}_{n=1,\ldots,N},$ $1<N<\# I$ at time
$t$ . Assume that the initial defaultin.$q$ bank $j_{1}$ faced with high foreign exchan.$qe$
risk suffers a huge mark-to-market gross loss by an amount $L_{1}$ which is $M$
times the amount of the sum of mark-to-market notional bilateral losses of
other participants with respect to the initial defaulter $j_{1}$ .
Consider any participating bank that has a net bilateral profit position
with the initial defaulter. And assume that at time $t$ it has a multilateral
perfectly hed.qed position and pairwise perfectly hed.qed positions with respect
to each of the defaultin.$q$ banks except for the initial defaulter. Then, its
systemic credit $e\varphi osure$ under multilateral nettin.$q$ is strictly greater than the
sum of bilateral credit exposures with respect to each of the banks along the
sequence of possible defaulters under bilateral nettin.$q$ if and only if the total
of notional bilateral profits of the remaining defaulters, with respect to the
initial defaulter, is strictly greater than the total of notional bilateral losses
of all the participants with respect to the initial defaulter, or differently put,
if and only if $M$ is lar.qe enou.qh so that its inverse is strictly less than the
proportion of the sum of notional bilateral profits of the remainin.$q$ defaulters
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